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Collective and Egoless Consciousness
Significance for Philosophy of Science and for
the Mind-Body Problem
Axel A. Randrup
Center for Interdisciplinary Research
Roskilde, Denmark

Collective consciousness and egoless consciousness can be regarded as realistic
alternatives or complements to individual consciousness. This contention is supported
by evidence from the literature (psychological, philosophical, anthropological,
spiritual, Buddhist) and by personal observations and interpretations. It contradicts
the idea that a philosophy which regards reality as consisting only of conscious
experiences must inevitably lead to solipsism.

I

previous paper (Randrup, 1997a) the
author proposed a skepticist-idealist
philosophy, claiming that reality consists entirely of conscious experiences. This proposal is
seen as a more consistent and unified alternative
to materialism. Science is regarded as a catalog
of intersubjective, conscious experiences ("observations") recognized as scientific and structured
by means of concepts and theories (also regarded
as conscious experiences). Materialism is seen as
possible and useful within a certain (large) domain, but inconsistent beyond that domain. This
view is supported by examples of contradictions
and problems met in materialist science (in cognitive neurophysiology, the evolutionary study of
cognition, statistics, physics, second-order cybernetics) and by the felt reality of intense nature
experiences (Randrup, 1997a).
Philosophies of this type (idealism, phenomenalism, skepticism) have been known in the West
in modern times since the work of the philosophers Berkeley and Hume in the 18th century and
have often been met with the objection that they
entail solipsism (Randrup, 1997a). I will argue
that solipsism (individualism) is only one possible
frame of reference for consciousness. Collective
N A

consciousness and egoless consciousness are seen
as viable alternatives or complements.
ea.,
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N DAILY life in Western

countries, much is related
to the individual, and the concept of the
individual seems clear. In Western philosophy,
however, there has been extended controversy
over the notions of "self," "individuality," and
"personal identity" (Gallagher, 1998; Gallagher
& Shear, 1997-1999; Hardy, 1998, pp. 33-37;
Hughes, 1999; Koffka, 1963, ch. 8; Kolak &
Martin, 1991; Mach, 1914, ch. I, sect. 12; Noonan,
1996; Penelhum, 1967; Turkle, 1984, 1997; White,
1997). And in recent years, ideas of computer and
brain networking, as well as studies of social
interaction, have suggested to some authors a
more collective concept of mind and consciousness
(Artigiani, 1995; Burns & Engdahl, 1998; Freeman
& Burns, 1996; Garfield, 1993; Graham, 1999;
Gustavson & Harung, 1994; Huberman, 1989;
Lansky, 1999; Nunez, 1997; Swing, 1999). Given
this background, it does not seem so obvious, as
is often assumed, that mind and consciousness
are always associated with an individual, and that
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regarding reality as consisting entirely of
conscious experiences should therefore entail
solipsism.
In various non-Western cultures, such as
African, Aboriginal Australian, American Indian,
East Asian, and "preconquest" cultures, views and
attitudes are encountered which emphasize the
collective and relational features ofhuman beings
and their minds at least as much as the individual
features; indeed it seems that modern Western
individualism is an exceptional or unique
phenomenon among the world's cultures, past and
present (Carrithers, Collins, & Lukes, 1985, chs.
5, 6, 7, 8; Harris, 1997; Hayward, 1987, pp. 55,
211-212, 281; Kao & Sinha, 1997, chs. 3, 9, 16;
Lommel, 1969, pp. 155, 159, 161; Mudimbe, 1987;
Ndaw, 1983, ch. 3 and pp. 205-207; Wautischer,
1998, chs. 2, 3, 5 ). As an example of emphasis on
the collective aspect, I quote Okuyama (1993), who
writes about the three senses of self among the
Japanese: the collective, the social, and the
individual sense. Ofthese, the collective sense is
seen as the most important and fundamental one.
Okuyama states explicitly:
Japanese people commonly think that the self
exists only in relationships with others ... our
mind is thought to exist in a field of
relationships. The self cannot be considered
separate from the relationship field nor having
as clear a boundary, as Western people
imagine ... one ofthe conditions to be an adult
is the ability to feel somebody else's or the
group's feelings. (p. 29)

Accordingly, Okuyama believes that restoring
a healthy collective sense of self is an important
task for psychotherapy. (Very recently Okuyama
[1999] has stated that she thinks the Japanese
are now losing their collective sense of self with
the result that many children and adolescents feel
lonely and disconnected.)
Although individuality is so prominent in
Western cultures and daily life, there are features
of collectivity. "Objective" science seems to be an
important example of this. In order to be
recognized as scientific, an observation has to be
confirmed by several scientists-become
intersubjective. An intersubjective observation is
often conceived as the same observation or
experience distributed over different individual
minds or consciousnesses and then unified by
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means of an "objective" materialist concept. It can,
however, also be conceived (and experienced) to
be unified from the beginning as one observation
constituting a part of a collective consciousness.
Both of these interpretations ofintersubjectivity
contradict solipsism. The materialist concepts are
usually projected "out there" and accorded an
existence oftheir own, separate from consciousness.
The latter step is intersubjective inside wide
circles, but it has led to contradictions as
mentioned in the introduction above and is not
shared by all (Randrup, 1997a). If the metaphysics
of objective materialism is given up, then the
interpretation involving collective consciousness
appears to be the natural way of expressing the
unity of intersubjective observations. Since
several intersubjective observations and theories
exist in science, we may envisage that scientists,
particularly individuals within one discipline,
have a significant part of their consciousness in
common, a collective consciousness. The collective
part of their consciousness will be associated with
the brains of all the persons involved and not only
with one brain (brains here are seen as heuristic
structures in the scientific catalog mentioned in
the introduction).
Other parts of mind or consciousness appear
to be more individual, but the boundary between
individual and collective consciousness is blurred.
If we talk together about our experiences, the
intersubjective or collective part will be expanded.
This aspect of intersubjectivity has been studied
thoroughly by the phenomenological school of
psychology at Copenhagen University (Rubin;
Tranekjrer Rasmussen; From). Tranekjrer
Rasmussen (1968, ch. 3, with references) writes
that through communication it is possible to make
certain conscious experiences "intersubjectively
transportable" within a group of people. A set of
intersubjectively transportable experiences is
called a recursive basis. Such a recursive basis is
established within scientific disciplines (technical
languages), but Tranekjaer Rasmussen writes that
within the disciplines little has been done to state
the recursive bases explicitly, and he thinks that
working to accomplish this will be an important
task for both epistemology and pedagogics.
Obtaining intersubjectivity in psychology/
psychiatry aided by communication between
scientists has been described recently in detail
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by Marchais, Grize, and Randrup (1995, p. 371),
and Hardy (1998, pp. 180-184) has described how
shared or interface "semantic constellations" can
emerge from ordinary conversation. It has also
been contended that many concepts such as
"eleven," "entropy," and even "solipsism" cannot
be individual at all, because from the beginning
they are shaped by education and verbal
communication (Jlllrgensen, 1963, p. 176; P.
Marchais, personal communication, March 20,
1999; Thornton, 1996). Thus, for example,
Thornton concludes that the concept "solipsism"
is inherently incoherent.
Living and acting together can also enhance
intersubjectivity and collective experience. The
Danish philosopher and psychologist Jlllrgensen
has discussed this in some detail (1963, ch. 7). He
writes about "person-identification," that is,
identification with another person, and distinguishes between emotive and conative forms. The
former refers to the catching effect of emotional
expressions and the latter refers to situations
where persons act together to reach the same goal.
More recently Vaughan (1995) wrote in a similar
way about emotive identification:
The soul that emphathetically identifies with
both the pain and the joy of others begins to
see that in the inner world we are not
separated from each other. Peace and joy, no
less than pain and sorrow, are shared,
collective experiences. (p. 5)

And in a recent special issue of the journal
ReVision (Rothberg & Masters, 1998), several
authors have given examples of collective and
egoless consciousness in couples living and acting together in intimate relationships. It seems
probable that living and acting closely together
in smaller groups has contributed to the experience and concepts of collective consciousness
encountered in various non-Western cultures.
It thus appears that there are means for
sharing experiences which at first sight appear
to be strictly individual and inaccessible to "other
minds" (Randrup, 1999). This is an alternative to
solipsism, and it recalls the old philosophical
problem about the far side of the moon, which for
many years was regarded as unobservable, until
it finally became possible to observe it by means
of space travel.

~
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experiences, the ego, the self, is
neglected or "forgotten." There are many
descriptions of such cases in the literature.
In reports of experiences regarded as spiritual
or mystical it is often mentioned that there is a
general feeling of unity including fading or
complete disappearance of the boundary between
subject and object. Dissolution of all ego
boundaries and forgetfulness of the ego are also
mentioned (Bastian, 1998; Cohen & Phipps, 1979,
pp. 92, 111; Flier, 1995, p. 144; Marchais, Grize,
& Randrup 1995, p. 381; Rothberg & Masters,
1998, pp. 16-17, 38-39; Smith & Tart, 1998, pp.
98,100, 105; Stace, 1960, ch. 2;Vaughan, 1989,
pp. 6, 8). In the literature about Buddhism and
Indian philosophy, egolessness or "empty of ego"
is discussed comprehensively. The moral
accompaniment of egolessness is described as
spontaneous compassion (Belfer, 1995; Epstein,
1989; Hayward, 1987; Joonho, 1999; Lindtner,
1998, pp. 11-12; Miller, 1996; Osho Rajneesh,
1997, ch.16; Pallis, 1998; Puhakka, 1998; Shakya,
1996, preface, chs. 2, 3, 5).
Some secular experiences are also described as
egoless. Thus Mach (1914, ch. I, sect. 12) writes
that during absorption in some idea the ego may
be partially or wholly absent. Similar statements
are given by Flier (1995, p. 144) and by Osho
Rajneesh (1997, ch. 16). More detailed descriptions
of single cases have been published by Koffka
(1963, pp. 323-328) and bymyself(Randrup, 1997a,
pp. 21-22 [a personal experience]).
Still, in daily life in Western cultures, the
physical and social world is most often perceived
with the ego in a central position. Since thought
is more flexible than perception, it is, however,
possible to think of the world in other ways,
decentered from the ego or even with another ego
as the center. The change from the Ptolemaic to
the Copernican view of the planetary system is
an example of such decentering. Since then,
science has continued the decentering process and
developed an "objective" world view. Because of
the flexibility of thought it is possible to switch
between decentered views and views centered on
an ego or a collective and thus incorporate
knowledge gained by the use of one system into
other systems. In this way it is possible to use
N EGOLESS
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decentered scientific knowledge either for
egoistical or collective purposes.
The decentered world of science is, however,
most often considered as a material world
projected "out there" and separate from the
human mind. This makes it difficult to place "the
observer" and consciousness in the scientific
picture. In contrast, an egoless experience of the
world (perceived or conceived) is still a conscious
experience and thus avoids the dichotomies
between observer and observed and between the
material and the mental. On such a monistic
background, worldviews centered on an ego,
centered on a collective, or completely decentered
(egoless) are not in conflict, but can be seen as
different structures in the same catalog of
conscious experiences or "observations." It is
known that there can be more than one structure
in a system of elements, for example, in
ambiguous figures. These are perceived in two or
more alternating gestalts only one at a time, but
in thought it can be conceived that the two or more
structures or gestalts exist simultaneously
(Burling, 1964; Randrup, 1992, 1997b; Rosen,
1978, pp. 495, 500).
~
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and interpretations discussed
above indicate that collective consciousness
and egoless consciousness can be regarded as
realistic alternatives or complements to the more
generally accepted individual consciousness in
Western cultures. This undermines the contention
that a philosophy which regards reality as
consisting entirely of conscious experiences must
inevitably lead to solipsism.
HE EVIDENCE

Notes
This paper is part of an ongoing study of idealist
philosophy and follows an earlier paper (Randrup,
1997a). I thank colleagues inside and outside the
Center for Interdisciplinary Research for discussions
and comments about this paper, especially Pierre
Marchais, Raymond Swing, and Philippe Gross.
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